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Abstract—In this paper, we study the secure transmission in
multihop wireless networks with randomize-and-forward (RaF)
relaying, in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdroppers.
By considering adaptive encoder with on-off transmission (OFT)
scheme, we investigate the optimal design of the wiretap code and
routing strategies to maximize the secrecy rate while satisfying
the secrecy outage probability (SOP) constraint. We derive the
exact expressions for the optimal rate parameters of the wiretap
code. Then the secure routing problem is solved by revising
the classical Bellman-Ford algorithm. Simulation results are
conducted to verify our analysis.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, routing, randomize-and-
forward (RaF).
I. INTRODUCTION
NODES cooperation to enhance the security communi-cation for wireless network has attracted considerable
interest. Most of the work in this area focused on one-
or two-hop networks [1–7]. The authors in [8] studied the
problem of secure connectivity for randomize-and-forward
(RaF) relaying strategy in cooperative wireless networks. The
authors in [9] and [10] investigated the physical layer security
of a buffer-aided half-duplex (HD) and full-duplex (FD) RaF
relaying wireless network, respectively. Only a few attempts
have addressed this problem in multihop relaying networks.
In multihop relaying networks, cooperation leads to smaller
geographical distance in each hop, which decreases the path
loss and destructive fading effects. On the other hand, more
hops results in lower spectral efficiency, and more transmitting
means more chances to be eavesdropped. As a result, there
exists a tradeoff between the hops and secure performance,
i.e., the problem of secure routing. The authors in [11, 12]
considered minimum energy routing in the presence of either
multiple malicious jammers or eavesdroppers, to guarantee
certain end-to-end performance. The authors in [13, 14]
considered the problem of how to communicate securely
with the help of untrusted relays and full-duplex jamming
relays, respectively. The authors in [15] addressed the secure
routing problem in multihop wireless networks with half-
duplex decode-and-forward (DF) relaying, where the locations
of the eavesdroppers were modeled as a homogeneous Poisson
point process (PPP). The authors in [16] studied the secure
connection problem in multihop wireless networks, where FD
jamming relays operate to enhance the physical layer security.
To our best knowledge, the rate adaptation by wiretap code
designs has not been considered in secure routing yet. In this
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paper, we study the secrecy rate maximization problem in
multihop wireless networks with RaF relaying, in the presence
of randomly distributed eavesdroppers. The location of the
eavesdroppers is modeled as a homogeneous PPP. The loca-
tions and channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdroppers
are unknown at the legitimate nodes. We consider the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) of a selected path as a constraint for
the system. We adopt the on-off transmission scheme [17],
i.e., transmission occurs only when the received signal-to-
noise (SNR) at the legitimate node exceeds the threshold.
At each hop, a wiretap code is used at the legitimate node
to ensure security according to the feedback of SNR from
the receiver. For adaptive encoder with on-off transmission
(OFT) scheme, we consider a network design problem of
maximizing the secrecy rate by the joint design the rate
parameters of the wiretap code and routing subject to the
end-to-end SOP constraint. The explicit expressions for the
optimal rate parameters for any given path are derived. Then
the secure routing problem is solved by adopting the revised
Bellman-Ford algorithm.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRIC
We consider a multihop relaying network consisting of
randomly distributed legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. For
a typical path L, the transmission of each hop is in a separate
slot subject to multiple colluding eavesdroppers. The location
of the eavesdroppers is modeled as a homogeneous PPP
with density λe denoted by Φne (n = 1, . . . , |L|), where |L|
is the number of hops of path L. All nodes are equipped
with one omni-directional antenna. The locations and CSI
of the eavesdroppers are unknown at the legitimate nodes,
but the legitimate nodes can characterize the statistics of the
eavesdroppers’ channel gains and positions. All channels are
modeled by large-scale fading with path loss exponent α
along with small-scale Rayleigh fading. The corresponding
channel gains are independent exponentially distributed with
unit mean. Hence, the instantaneous received SNR at the
legitimate node and eavesdropper e in Φne (n = 1, . . . , |L|)
of the nth-hop can be respectively given as:
SNRn ,
pnHn
|Dn|α
, SNRne ,
pnSne
|Xne|α
, (1)
where pn represents the transmit power of the nth-hop;Hn and
|Dn| are Rayleigh fading gain and distance between the nth-
hop, respectively; Sne and |Xne| are Rayleigh fading gain and
distance between the legitimate node and eavesdropper e of the
nth-hop, respectively. Since RaF relaying strategy is used, the
source and relays nodes use different codebooks to transmit the
2secret message and the relays add independent randomization
in each hop when re-coding the received message, so the
eavesdroppers can not combine the information from multiple
hops. The total received SNR at the eavesdroppers of the nth-
hop is given as
SNR
sum
ne
=
∑
e∈Φne
SNRne =
∑
e∈Φne
pnSne
|Xne|α
. (2)
We adopt the well-known Wyner’s encoding scheme as
follows [18]. For each of the distinct messages to be secretly
transmitted, the transmitters would randomly choose one of
several possible codewords according to a local random num-
ber generator. We can therefore understand a wiretap code as
having a nested structure. The transmitters use two kinds of
parameters, namely, the rate of the transmitted codewords Rt
and the rate of the confidential information Rs to encode the
secrecy message. The rate difference Re , Rt−Rs represents
the rate loss for transmitting the message securely against
eavesdropping. We assume that there is no retransmission in
each hop to reduce the risk of being eavesdropped. We adopt
the OFT scheme, i.e., transmission occurs only when the re-
ceived SNR at the legitimate node exceeds the SNR threshold
βt = 2
Rs − 1. To enable the OFT scheme, the receiver needs
to feed back full information of the instantaneous SNR to the
transmitter. By doing so, the transmitter is able to adaptively
choose Rt, i.e., the transmitter sets Rt arbitrarily close to the
capacity of the legitimate channel. Then the SOP of the nth-
hop is defined as the conditional probability [2, 17]:
P
′
so , P
(
log2
(
1 + SNRn
1 + SNRsum
ne
)
< Rs | SNRn > βt
)
. (3)
According to [19], the message is secured if every hop in
the path is secured. Hence, the end-to-end SOP of the path
can be expressed as
Pso , P
(
min
{
log
2
(
1 + SNRn
1 + SNRsumne
)}
< Rs
∣∣∣min {SNRn} > βt
)
.
(4)
Since the transmission in each hop is independent, (4) is equivalent
to
Pso = 1−
|L|∏
n=1
(
1− P
′
so
)
. (5)
Theorem 1: The end-to-end SOP of a path is given by
Pso = 1− exp

−K12 2Rsα |L|∑
n=1
|Dn|
2

, (6)
where K1 = πλeΓ(1+
2
α
)Γ(1− 2
α
) and Γ (·) is the gamma function.
Proof: See Appendix A.
According to (6), we can see that Pso is independent of the
transmit power pn, which means that the improvement of capacity
for both the legitimate and eavesdropping channels are the same as
the transmit power grows. Hence, we can not enhance the security
by increasing the transmit power.
III. SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this study, we consider the optimization problem of maximizing
the secrecy rate while satisfying the SOP constraint as follows:
P1 : max
Rs,L∈LSD
Cs =
Rs
|L|
, (7a)
s.t. Pso (Rs, L) ≤ ǫ, (7b)
Rs > 0, (7c)
where LSD is the set of all possible paths L connecting the source and
destination; ǫ ∈ [0, 1] represents the minimum security requirement.
From (7a), we know that more hops |L| reduces the transmission
distance in each hop which in turn allows higher Rs but the decrease
of Cs. In addition, more hops also means more chances to be
eavesdropped which leads to higher Pso. As a result, there exist a
tradeoff between the hops |L| and secure performance.
Since Rs is independent of L and Pso is an increasing function
of Rs, it is easy to observe that the optimal solution occurs at
Pso (Rs, L) = ǫ for (7b). The obtained Rs is given by
Rs
∗ =
α
2
log
2

 ln 11−ǫ
K1
∑
l∈L
|Dl|2

. (8)
Moreover, substituting (8) into (7c), we can obtain the upper bound
of the eavesdroppers’ density as
λe <
ln 1
1−ǫ
πΓ(1 + 2
α
)Γ(1− 2
α
)
∑
l∈L
|Dl|2
. (9)
Then we can reformulate P1 as
P1
′ : max
L∈LSD
Cs =
α
2 |L|
log
2

 ln 11−ǫ
K1
∑
l∈L
|Dl|2

 (10a)
s.t. λe <
ln 1
1−ǫ
πΓ(1 + 2
α
)Γ(1− 2
α
)
∑
l∈L
|Dl|2
. (10b)
Theorem 2: The optimization problem P1′ is equivalent to the
following problem:
P2 : Mt(L
∗) = max
1≤v≤NL−1
Mt(L˜v), (11)
where
Mt(L˜v) =
α
2
∣∣∣L˜v∣∣∣ log2

 ln 11−ǫ
K1
∑
l∈L˜v
|Dl|2

, (12)
and
L˜v =

 arg minL∈LSD:|L|≤v
∑
l∈L
|Dl|
2, if
∑
l∈L˜v
|Dl|
2 <
ln
1
1−ǫ
K1
,
∅, otherwise.
(13)
Here NL is the number of the legitimate nodes; L
∗ and L˜v are the
optimal solution to P2 and subproblem (13), respectively; Mt(L
∗)
and Mt(L˜v) are the corresponding optimal values of the objective
function.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 implies that P1′ can be solved optimally by solving
a sequence of subproblems (13). It is easy to see that the solution
to (13) without constraint for a given hop-count v means that each
link uses |Dl|
2 as the link weights to find the path connecting the
source and the destination which has the minimum total link weights
and is no more than v hops. Having the weighting factor of v in
the objective function, the optimization problem cannot be solved
3Algorithm 1 Secure routing algorithm
Input: Topology information which contains the neighbor list
and transmission distance |Dl| between them;
Output:
1: Each legitimate node sets |Dl|
2 as link weights.
2: Obtain the shortest path L˜v in each iteration
v (1, . . . , NL − 1) while the total link weights is less than
ln
1
1−ǫ
K1
by the classical Bellman-Ford algorithm;
3: Calculate the function values for each path L˜v using (12);
4: Get the optimal path L∗ with the maximum function value
using (11);
5: Get the optimal value of Rs of the path L
∗ using (8);
6: return L∗ and Rs
∗;
directly by using the classical Bellman-Ford algorithm, because it
does not take the weighting factor into account. Hence, we develop
a revised Bellman-Ford algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1.
Before using the algorithm, each legitimate node calculates the
distances between itself and all neighboring nodes. Then it sends
its topology information to all neighboring nodes and runs this
distributed algorithm separately [20]. From Algorithm 1, the main
implementation complexity of the algorithm is dominated by Step 1.
Hence, Algorithm 1 has the same level of computational complexity
as the classical Bellman-Ford algorithm, which is O(NL
3) [20].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate and analyze the numerical results for
the SOP performance and secrecy rate performance.
First, we simulate a multihop wireless network, in which
the nodes are deployed in a 2000 × 2000 square area. The
eavesdroppers are located at randomly and follow a homogeneous
PPP. We consider an example of 6 legitimate nodes whose
locations are at (−10, 0), (5 cos (0.75π) , 5 sin (0.75π)),
(0, 0), (5 cos (−0.25π) , 5 sin (−0.25π)), (10, 0) and
(15 cos (0.25π) , 15 sin (0.25π)). We assume that α = 4 and
pn = 80dB for all n.
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Fig. 1. SOP versus the density of the eavesdroppers λe.
Fig. 1 depicts the SOP versus the density of the eavesdroppers λe.
It can be seen that our analysis results perfectly agree to the Monte
Carlo simulation results, which validates our analysis. As the value
of λe and the number of hops grows, the SOP increases.
Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) depict the secrecy rate Cs versus the density
of the eavesdroppers λe and versus secrecy constraint ǫ, respectively.
As the density of the eavesdroppers λe increases, SOP constraint
ǫ decreases and as the number of hops grows, the cost of against
eavesdropping increases. Hence, the secrecy rate Cs of the path and
the corresponding tolerable density of the eavesdroppers decrease.
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Fig. 2. (a) Secrecy rate Cs versus the density of the eavesdroppers λe. (b)
Secrecy rate Cs versus secrecy constraint ǫ.
Then, we simulate a scenario that legitimate nodes are placed
uniformly at random on a 50 × 50 square area in the center of
the network. The source node is placed at the lower left corner of
the network and the destination is located at the upper right corner.
Note that the eavesdroppers are still randomly distributed in the entire
network of size 2000× 2000. Our goal is to find the highest secrecy
rate path between the source and destination. We assume that α = 4,
λe = 10
−5, ǫ = 0.1 and pn = 80dB for all n. For different number
of legitimate nodes, we simulate the different routing algorithms
10000 times and obtain the average secrecy rates. The results are
shown in Table I.
In Table I, NL denotes the number of legitimate nodes. C
RaF
s
and C
DF
s represent the average secrecy rate for RaF and DF relaying
strategies, respectively1. As shown in the table, both of them increase
with the number of legitimate nodes growing. It is because that more
legitimate nodes results in the more choices to get a safer route for
a given source-destination pair. And the secrecy performance of RaF
scheme is always better than that of the DF scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the secure transmission in a multihop
relaying network with the help of the relays using randomize-and-
forward (RaF) relaying strategy in the presence of homogeneous
Poisson point process (PPP) distributed colluding eavesdroppers. We
formulated the problem of maximizing the secrecy rate by the joint
design of the wiretap code and routing subject to the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) constraint. Explicit expressions for the optimal
rate parameter of wiretap code were derived, and the secure routing
problem was also solved by the revised Bellman-Ford algorithm.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to (1) and (2), (3) can be rewritten as
P
′
so = 1− P

log2

 1 + pnHn|Dn|α
1 +
∑
e∈Φne
pnSne
|Xne|α

 > Rs | SNRn > βt

 .
(14)
Then, (14) can be turned to
P
′
so = 1− P
(
pnHn
|Dn|α
> βt + 2
Rs
∑
e∈Φne
pnSne
|Xne|α
| SNRn > βt
)
.
(15)
1Because of space limitation, the details of the analysis for the DF scheme
are not presented in the paper.
4TABLE I
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT RELAYING STRATEGIES VARYING WITH THE NUMBER OF LEGITIMATE NODES
NL 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
C
RaF
s 0.2382 0.3373 0.3739 0.3932 0.4049 0.4120 0.4182 0.4223 0.4257 0.4283
C
DF
s 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.008 0.0031 0.0072 0.0127 0.0194 0.0256 0.0311
Since the memoryless property of exponential distribution, (15) is
equivalent to
P
′
so = 1− P
(
Hn
|Dn|α
> 2Rs
∑
e∈Φne
Sne
|Xne|α
)
. (16)
Then (16) can be rewritten as
P
′
so = 1− EΦne,Sne
{
exp
[
−|Dn|
α2Rs
∑
e∈Φne
Sne
|Xne|α
]}
. (17)
Since Sne is independent and identically distributed, thus the
expectation over the sum of Sne is equal to the product of the
expectation over Sne. Then (17) can be turned to
P
′
so = 1− EΦne,Sne
{ ∏
e∈Φne
exp
[
−|Dn|
α2Rs
Sne
|Xne|α
]}
. (18)
Then (18) can be rewritten to
P
′
so = 1− EΦne


∏
e∈Φne
1
2Rs |Dn|α
|Xne|α
+ 1

. (19)
For a homogeneous PPP, the probability generating functional
(PGFL) is given by [21]
EΦe
[ ∏
e∈Φe
f (e)
]
= exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
1− f (e) de
]
. (20)
According to (20), (19) can be rewritten as:
P
′
so = 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
2Rs |Dn|
α
2Rs |Dn|α + |Xne|α
de
]
. (21)
Then (21) can be simplified as:
P
′
so = 1− exp
[
−K12
2Rs
α |Dn|
2
]
. (22)
Replacing P
′
so with (22) into (5), we can obtain (6).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Similar to [15], we can prove that problem P1′ without the
constraint (10b) can be solved optimality by solving a sequence of
subproblems
Mt(Lv) =
α
2 |Lv |
log
2

 ln 11−ǫ
K1
∑
l∈Lv
|Dl|2

, v = 1, . . . , NL − 1,
(23)
where Lv is the optimal solution to following problem
Lv = arg max
L∈LSD:|L|≤v
α
2v
log
2

 ln 11−ǫ
K1
∑
l∈Lv
|Dl|2

. (24)
Then, (24) is equivalent to
Lv = arg min
L∈LSD:|L|≤v
∑
l∈L
|Dl|
2
. (25)
When Lv is not satisfied the constraint (10b), the problem (25)
has no feasible solution for the problem P1′.
This completes the proof.
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